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This paper concentrates on the radical political trend current am ongst the clergy o f the m ainstream churches o f the West. I t begins by se t ting o u t sum m arily the sociological trends within which these trends occur. The first trend is the continuing process o f differentiation. This m eans that ecclesiastical bodies tend to withdraw fro m explicit p olitical involvem ent, w hether this be the old "in tig riste " position d o m in a n t in the late nineteenth century, or the Christian dem ocracy o f m ore recent years. D ifferentiation also m eans th a t clergy are edged o u t o f traditional social structures and lose co n ta ct w ith the im plicit understandings which held those structures together. T hey are fo rced to define themselves. In som e cultures, notably those o f Eastern E u rope, the traditional social structures are ju st destroyed. The priest h o o d is le ft as an isolated profession serving a rem nant, and officially deprived o f influences and pow er outside that remnant. The o ther trend is tow ard clerical specialization and the build-up o f religious bureaucracies and agencies at national and international levels. These ten d to lose contact with the local Christian co n stitu ency. Thus m any clergy are assimilated to the social role o f the in telligentsia, and com e to share the left-liberal and even the radical or M arxist a ttitu d e m andatory in that social sector. Influences are fe d into these agencies congruent w ith the left-w ing a ttitu d es o f the pro gressive m iddle class. O ther influences derive fro m the increasing par ticipation o f Christians fro m the third world, fro m the theology o f revolution, black theology, and so on. D uring the course o f this paper, d istinctions will be m ade betw een the crucial areas o f progress with respect to race and poverty, and a rhetorical sty le o f cultural politics indulged in by the m iddle class sector o f econom ically advanced na tions. I t will fu rth e r be argued that the new cultural politics espoused by m any clergy (w ith ram ifications in theology and liturgy} are fu ll o f contradictions and e m p ty o f serious political analysis. I begin with som e general exam ples and som e remarks on the World C ouncil o f Churches (W.C.C.). I then lo o k a t lessening ecclesiastical
Differentiation. The typical "radical" Christian despises the simple civic pieties of ordinary people. He is rightly suspicious of the stoic chumminess represented by t4Scout-ing for Boys•" He exalts the prophetic tradition, but forgets that in a whole millennium of biblical history the number of prophets barely exceeded a dozen. The history of hu man aspiration is very much a history of civic and civil reli gion, and one may assume that the average sensual man will concur with the pieties of his kind and find identity in the signs and symbols of his group. The admirable Rec tor of Bethnal Green in London's East End may declare the People's flag deepest red，but to most Englishmen， Americans, and Frenchmen for that matter，it is red， white, and blue. The same point is true mutatis mutandis for Ja pan. A civil sensibility and a civic piety is not the whole faith delivered once and for all to the saints, but it is ca pable of expressing a decent sense of identity and of loyaltyincluding, sometimes， loyalty to liberty.
The last point about loyalty to liberty is important. For Christians to criticize and lament the crushing pressure of thoughtless patriotism is one thing. To lambast and deni grate the loyalties which provide the base of liberty is some thing quite different. Liberality draws deep on the well of conservation. The prophetic incision into cancerous pa triotism easily cuts out the vital organs of identity and liberty at the same time.
The same applies to Christian criticisms of folk religion.
To draw up the skirts of sectarian virtue and rectitude is to reject the very possibility of religious institutions inform ing culture at large. The core institutions of cultural piety are certainly being pushed by pressures of differentiation in a sectarian direction, but -in the West at least -some Christians precisely desire the pure and costless righteous ness of the sect. They want to accelerate differentiation. Moral criticism could then be so easy and total. Moral para sitism could be embraced as a way of life, and Christians could adopt moral postures as clean and pure as any membe-of the humanist intelligentsia. For some Christians that is "a consummation devoutly to be wished."
Religious bureaucracies. Not merely do zealous political churchmen ignore or despise the undertow of the ancient pieties on which democratic sentiment reposes, but they adopt a political rhetoric which they direct with special fervor at Western democracy. Listening to this kind of pro nouncement, one would suppose sin merely an adjunct of capitalist organization. Up to the Nairobi Conference in the seventies the totalitarian record of Eastern European countries rarely received this same prophetic scrutiny. It even seemed as if Eastern European Christians could go to hell so far as the W.C.C. was concerned, provided that the official representatives of Orthodoxy were allowed out to have their photographs taken at ecumenical gatherings. Some clergy actually regretted the importunity of dissident Baptists and other awkward enthusiasts for faith and liberty. The situation was, of course, not easy. The Orthodox were important for W.C.C. strategy, and any contact with them，on whatever basis, seemed better than silence and separation.
Eastern European Christians themselves were poised over a knife-edge, used as political ambassadors by governments which were ready to exercise a harsh domestic discipline should they play any variations on the role as signed them. The same pressures operated on the Chris tian Peace Conferences held in Prague, until peace finally descended on Prague in 1968. At the same time the W.C.C. was influenced by the new theological thinking thrown up by the pressure of events in Latin America. This is mainly a Catholic phenomenon, since right-wing governments either attempt to use the Church or else thrust it aside. Neverthe less, the "theology of revolution" transcends confessional differences. Theologians of revolution pour new political potions inside the old wineskins，pressing traditional lan guage to new uses.
The problem here is how to know where the shift in mean ings has crossed the frontier between social change promoted on a Christian basis and revolution walking behind a smoke screen of Christian vocabulary. This is where the doctrine of the Eucharist provides a very sensitive indicator. Some revolutionary theologians understand the Eucharist as "God" realized in a communal feast. Others stress anticipation of a revolutionary feeding of the fifty million to come in the new society, or else reject all celebration now until the transformed future makes celebration appropriate.
The underlying problem for Catholicism in Latin America re lates to the very different stages present in the same society, resulting in a Church stretched out all the way from an ar chaic patrimonial religion of festivals and saints to the radi cal theology of middle class revolutionaries. Nobody knows just how far Christianity can ride the Marxist tiger without being gobbled up, physically and conceptually, when "the time" comes.
Reduced involvement in party politics. Apart from the impact of third world alignments, the politics of orthodox participation, revolutionary and black theology, there is the situation in Western Europe itself, more especially as concerns "Christian Democracy." This is an almost entirely Catholic matter, but religious changes have cooperated with other factors to undermine the stabilities created by ('Chris tian Democracy" in the immediate postwar world. In most countries the church-going constituency has been relatively conservative in its voting habits, but over the past decade the stability of confessional voting has become more and more eroded, in Holland, Switzerland, Germany, Italy, and elsewhere. The Church has become increasingly unhappy about Christian Democracy as the political arm of corporate Christianity and has complained about being caught up in a neoliberal profane dynamism, especially in West Germany. Thus the Roman Catholic Church in Germany has respond ed to the lessening of anti-clerical sentiment amongst the Social Democrats and withdrawn from involvement with theC.D.U.
It is noteworthy that even in Portugal the Church wisely kept at a safe distance from the party which claimed a Chris tian label. Indeed, in Portugal individual Christians have taken up positions at most points of the political spectrum, though the local priests in the north of the country made a signal contribution to the defeat of communist hegemony. In most countries Christians have been repelled by the Com munist Party itself, preferring to cooperate with free-ranging Marxists or going behind the Communist Party to join up with the extreme left. Spain is somewhat exceptional in this. Not only has a huge sector of the priesthood shifted to a socialist alignment in the last decade, but there are nu merous Christians associated with the Communist Party, more especially of course since it adopted a revisionist po sition.
Political attitudes o f the clergy. Here I come more directly to the political attitudes of the clergy, which commentators like Mr. Clifford Longley of the London times think imply a major reorientation with consequences for Western cul tures at large. Any discussion of these attitudes must dis tinguish between Catholics and Protestants. This is because the disturbances of the past decade and a half have affected Catholics more intensely, in terms of declines in practice,1 of alterations in the alignment of ecclesiastical power, of shifts in role specification, and of the cultural politics of liturgical change. The net result is that whereas Catholic priests were once the most anti-Marxist in their attitude， they are now quite prone to the Marxist seduction. By the same token, the Anglican Church, once labelled "The Con servative Party at Prayer， " has a powerful left-liberal lobby and visible Marxoidal fringe.
The Protestant churches, meaning especially Methodists, Baptists, and Congregationalists, are relatively undisturbed and less likely to bend in the radical wind. Their tradition al, established liberalism innoculates them somewhat against the ideological fevers ravaging their more ancient and hi erarchical rivals. Protestant cultures are in any case resist ant both to ecclesiastical doctrine and political dogma，and their experiential emphasis already anticipates the modem cult of experience. They have less far to go and are there fore less inclined to hurry on the journey.
Two points need to be made before charting radical trends amongst Catholics and Protestants. One is that old-fashioned liberals in the Protestant dissenting world are pragmatically active in various movements of social change，even if they mostly lack the trendy overtone. They work，for example， in community politics in the U.S.A. They take positive positions on the women's issue. They are active against authoritarian government or racial injustice in various con texts, for example， South Korea and South Africa. The excep tions are easily listed. One such exception is where Calvinist or conservative evangelical religion is linked to a culture under pressure, as occurs in parts of the American South, Northern Ireland, and white, especially Dutch, South Africa.2 The other is where the paternal, even military, element in Calvinism remains potent, and this will result in somewhat conservative attitudes to the women's issue.
The other point touches on the priestly traditions of An glicanism and Catholicism. Here the roots ramify over three millennia. They connect role specifications in the priest hood with male and female images in Catholic iconography and dogma and also with role specifications in the culture at large as between male and female. These profound link ages require both a sociological probe and psychoanalytic understanding. All that need be said for the purposes of this argument is that the unhinging of the linkages at the levels of role and religious images provides some of the psy chic impetus behind the disorientations described.
Radical trends amongst Catholics. It is the link between church doctrine and party dogma which provides the first clue to Catholic developments. Catholicism and Commu nism are both ideological systems, defining truth and ex communicating dissidents. Both have their bastions in rel atively archaic, patrimonial social structures. Up to quite recently, the Catholic system provided its priesthood with clear definitions of role and a secure anchorage for identity. Once those definitions became fluid and once the bark of Peter shifted at anchor, many priests were sucked into a whirlpool. Some embraced psychic and political liberation at one and the same time, and were unable to check the impetus of their release from the old structure. There was an easy transition from an ancient system of compulsory beliefs to a contemporary system of required ideology. Simple piety easily became naive political rhetoric, tripping off the tongue like a refurbished sermon.
Others fell into mere confusion and experienced a gen eralized fear of all authority and ritual highly congruent with the stance of the left-liberal intelligentsia. They were unable to exercise the authority inherent in the priestly role and became awkward charges on their parishes. Most ly they fled the parishes, preferring, for example, university chaplaincies where they could disseminate their preferred political opinions in a congenial atmosphere and help dis organize the constituency of young intellectual Catholics. From the universities they had come, to the universities they would go. Life did not supervene. Their socialism exploited the evident if superficial analogy between me dieval organicism and m odern collectivism.3 Their litur gical experiments combined echoes from the middle class spontaneity cult with mandatory groupiness: the higher Buddyhood. This combination can generate contradictory thrusts: spontaneity pushes toward therapy and encoun ter, while the groupiness can mutate toward the political cell. This mutation is particularly evident in some of the orders, especially the Dominicans. The shift from the mo nastic cell to the political cell is fairly easy. Some people enjoy being enclosed in both at the same time.
At the moment the contradiction between the demands of revolutionary discipline and the thrust toward psychic exploration is not fully evident. This is because even the Marxoidal gloss is sentimental. Catholic Marxism, like a great deal of secular Western Marxism, is suffused with nos talgia. It rejects the homogenizing thrust of modern indus trial societies, regrets the vanishing crafts, the colors and graininess of p re industrial life. Small is beautiful: inter mediate technology, minority speech, or whatever allows the human scale.
The political cell, the commune, and the monastic com munity, all share this human scale. For the Catholic there is the frisson of reviving the archaic in the context of the revolutionary. Anglo-Catholics within the Church of Eng land exploit exactly the same frisson, and do so with a great deal of charm. Nostalgia can be given the gloss of the fu ture as well as the glow of the past. This is very seductive and the defender of, say, the ancient language, traditions, and rights of Languedoc need not wonder whether he is also an unwitting protagonist of Soviet hegemony. Roman tic Catholicism can link hands with Romantic Revolution and no questions asked. The paradigm of all this is the pure white of the Dominican robe joined to the blood-red of the People's Flag. The effect is not to incorporate the Chris tian body in the revolutionary army. It is to smudge vital distinctions and to soften up the frame of discourse.
Some Catholics observe the lack of serious Marxist spine behind this style of thinking and are aware that it can quite easily shift toward the plenary indulgences of the spon taneity cult，the indiscriminate appreciation of "cultures， " and the inward looking therapies of the sect. As one Domini can remarked about the new liturgical forms: if the People of God stand in a circle, how can they be en marche? If the Catholic '"ine， ，and orientation are unhinged，can it be reformed as a disciplined march to the future? (The same question was asked of the student movement: how far did it indulge experience at the expense of revolution ary discipline?)
The answer is: it all depends. The future has become a key category in some theological thinking, whether Catho lic or Protestant. Once theologians are deprived of faith they turn to hope, and hope frustrated converts to politicsor back to classic Augustinian realism. When God ceases to be transcendent he is reembodied in the community and the future, more especially the community which marches forward into the future. Jesus becomes the teacher of this community and is recast either as a hippy preacher or as a zealot revolutionary sympathizer -or Moses takes over and rings the liberation bell to lead the oppressed to the Promised Land. God participates in history, at first obscure ly, and then achieves full revelation in the face of the Risen and Glorified People.
From this point on any number of symbolic translations can be arranged. Marxism can be identified as the move ment of the Spirit for Today and Tomorrow. Once "God" is dead a whole new resonance can be given to the idea of the Holy Ghost. Professor Harvey Cox, for example, has been notorious for finding holy and ghostly activity in what ever catches his lively political fancy. The difficulty is that these translations of transcendence first arouse euphoria and then deflate and empty the very dynamism they were intended to sustain. They are the fun thing for half a dec ade, and then their proponents have to move on.
It is worth adding that the Marxist-Christian dialogue, for all its seriousness, involves tendentious translations of the classic texts on both sides of the divide. This was a point made over a decade ago by Alisdair MacIntyre. Marxists straining to make sense of Christianity and to be open to it easily distort both their own tradition and the religious tradition. The same happens to Christians who wish to in corporate Marxist perspectives. Marxism, after all, is not just a method of analysis which is simultaneously a move ment for social justice: it is a new all-embracing ontology which cannot do business with error or tolerate regression to archaic superstition. (I would here draw attention to a brilliant work by an American socialist and Christian, Dale Vree，"On synthesizing Marxism and Christianity， " 1976， which underlines the difficulties of the dialogue and the marginal character of those who undertake it.) Radical trends amongst Protestants. I turn now more spe cifically to those manifestations of a radical clerisy which have appeared in Protestantism, more especially the An glican Church.
The point of departure is a pair of words: "conformist" and "establishment." Both carry a heavy abusive charge, accentuated by their imprecision. They are calculated to strike additional terror into the hearts of clergy because the broad secular meaning overlaps the special ecclesiasti cal meaning. Lots of people in secular professions manage to be firmly "established" without knowing it or recogniz ing it. So they are not at all frightened by the word. In deed the left-liberal establishment uses "established" as a dismissive term. It defends its established position by seem ing to attack "the establishment."
But the Anglican clergy are officially designated officers of an established church, and even Methodists and Baptists are socially well-established. Clergy can feel the stigma of establishment acutely, and long to repudiate such a com promising connection. It does not matter that few people are interested in the disestablishment of the Church. The point is that many clergy feel their credentials undermined by their secular entanglements and want to rid themselves of moral ambiguity. This moral ambiguity does not matter to the average sensual radical, who can be a successful law yer or wealthy publicist, or a richly rewarded denizen of the media without suffering serious discomfort. It is only the ambassadors of Christian revolution who feel their cre dentials smirched by their ascribed social role. So they agi tate for a return to the primitive condition of the Church before it became the religion of the Roman Empire. They set up a seductive symmetry between the pre-Constantinian Church and the post-Constantinian Church. Once Chris tianity recovers the role of radical sect it will rediscover its true mission and therewith its elan. Ambiguity will have been abolished and complication eradicated.
A minority of clergy are pushed in this direction by a new marginality of which they are increasingly conscious. They are being edged out of the old secure role in an un derstood social structure and yet still inhibited from adopt ing an uncompromised, uncompromising oppositional stance. To live in near-apostolic poverty and be labelled a paid agent of the status quo is more than even Christian flesh can bear. To live courageously at the economic margin and have smart commentators hurl the casual adjective "con formist" is deeply hurtful. To misquote the old liturgy: the burden of pejorative adjectives is intolerable.
So established clergy seek ecclesiastical and secular non conformity, if haply they may find it. We are all noncon formists now, just as we are all left-liberals. But this new cultural orthodoxy underlines a curious paradox. By adopt ing mandatory left-liberalism the marginal cleric may succeed in repudiating the old establishment, but he has also em braced the new one with open arms. He has levered him self out of the private school nexus and become a recruit to the kinds of conformity required along the marches of the media and academic.
Left-liberal conformism. Once recruited to these views, what basic stances are required of the political cleric? First, he is to reject the establishment, the status quo, and conform ity. He is to assimilate his appearance to that of a healthyminded layman. He is to espouse "self-realization" or "selfactualization， ， ，but not competition or achievement. Self expression is a good， but individualism is an evil; community is approved and consensus disapproved. Thus there is a list of prescribed words and a list of proscribed words indi cating rival positions in cultural politics. The political cleric must ritually recite the prescribed words and abominate the proscribed words.
Why is self-expression all right and individualism anathema? Because individualism refers to the Protestant Ethic of thrift, initiative, self-discipline, and the desire to achieve some thing in the world, while self-expression refers to the lib erated self in authentic spontaneous dialogue and encounter with significant others. This is what the Marxist theore tician Adorno called the jargon of authenticity, and up to quite recently radical sermons and pronouncements were spattered with this jargon.
Work inhibits, self exhibits. The self is characteristically exhibited in group encounter.
Political religion dislikes the Church but loves the group. The group can be drawn out of society and, as observed above, is first cousin to the political cell. This is how liturgy comes to be deployed as a kind of slow-motion group theater, a personal exhibi tion of aggressive cultural politics. A significant sector of liturgical experiment is a pure emanation of groupiness, carefully rubbing out the frames and spaces in which in dividuality was nourished and protected. These experi ments are legitimated as returns to primitive practice, but they are the cultural politics of the sixties carried on by other means. For example, one may or may not like the clutches, grips, and handshakes which go under the name of the Kiss of Peace, but this kind of mandatory sponta neity is a version of the American feely-feelies and the groupgrope. People are well and truly touched, made whole or maddened by the laying on of hands.4
The phrase "laying on of h a n d s ， ，m ay introduce one fur ther curious feature of clerical zealotry. It exhibits a strong tincture of neo-clericalism. It often emanates from tradi tionally clericalist churches and revives the clerical attitude in plausible disguise. It exalts the laos, the People of God， but despises the congregation. The zealous political cleric often has as little real respect for the People of God as the zealous political academic has for the People. The People of God and the People always need to be liberated from sin or false consciousness by the energy and foresight of the elect.
The form of that liberation remains a problem. Some political clerics make the traditional appeal to personal re sponsibility. Others rail against structural constraints. The former believe in the potency of goodwill，the latter in the malignancy of social arrangements, more especially those of capitalist society. When goodwill patently fails，there ensues a period of breast-beating and self-flagellation for which there is no absolution. Those confronted by the deep resistance of structures hunt for scapegoats -and can find them in individual Christians, or in the Church as an insti tution, or in Christian doctrine. (Thus one very distinguished theologian, Gregory Baum, asked me what theological ad justments I had made since the politico-religious murders in Northern Ireland.) These febrile shifts，breast-beatings, and searches for scapegoats arise because political realism in the Augustinian tradition has been forgotten. Naive op timism turns compulsively through every circle of unhappi ness, accusation, and frustration. Soft Utopians. At any rate there remains the basic contra diction. Part of the radical thrust is spiritual psychology and encounter ideology tuned to Christian instruments. It sometimes overflows in a political vocabulary, but con tains little enough by way of serious political analysis. It may also overflow in courageous political witness, but there is still no serious assessment of what kind of society even tually is to be achieved by political action or what costs are to be met and values to be sacrificed en route.
So the political clergymen, basically,. are not really en marche. They are assembling the nicest possible ensemble of attitudes. And they are also softening up the frame of discourse. Political sermons disseminate a vocabulary and an accepted frame of discussion even though they are foreign to the complexities, paradoxes, ambiguities, and unintended consequences native to political analysis and action. Their contribution to political attitudes and attitudinizing should not be underestimated. Hard Utopians know how to use soft Utopians when "the time" comes. Niceness is not with out penalties nor naivete without costs.5
